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We show how the prospect of disputes over firms’ revenue reports promotes debt
financing over equity. This is demonstrated in a costly state verification model
with a risk-averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive
contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic monitoring, even when the
lender can commit to stochastic monitoring. Consequently, optimal contracts
shift from equity toward standard debt. In short, when audit signals are weakly
correlated with true incomes, standard debt contracts emerge as optimal; if au-
dit signals are highly correlated with true incomes, optimal contracts resemble
equity. When audit costs are sufficiently high, stochastic monitoring may be opti-
mal. Optimal standard debt contracts under imperfect audits are shown to repro-
duce key empirical facts of U.S. firm borrowing.
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Introduction and overview
What form should an optimal external finance contract take to handle the prospect of
audit errors? Our answer is that standard debt contracts are often optimal. Thus, we
propose a theory of debt and limited liability based on inaccurate auditing.
We conduct the analysis in a costly state verification environment that typically im-
plies that equity contracts are optimal. However, that conclusion is shown to rest cru-
cially on the efficacy of the audit technology. We introduce wrongful penalties through
an imperfect audit technology although our results carry over to other situations where
the lender or bankruptcy court might erroneously dispute the borrower’s revenue re-
port.1
In the model we present, a contract is an enforceable agreement between a risk-
averse borrower and a risk-neutral lender covering the amount borrowed (leverage), an
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audit strategy dependent on the state of nature declared by the borrower, and payoffs
to the parties given the declared state of nature and the findings of any audit. Perceived
misreporting may be penalized and truth-telling may be rewarded. Whether the audit is
perfect—capable without exception of identifying the true underlying state—can make
all the difference to the form of the optimal contract.
The literature currently suggests that parties to an external finance contract ought to
employ stochastic audits and levy rewards/penalties liberally. Stochastic audits save on
resources, leaving more for consumption, and payments and penalties can be used both
to reward truth-telling and to penalize misreporting. Moreover, as long as consumption
is perfectly observed, sometimes ever-increasing rewards and penalties may be used
to sustain truth-telling while economizing on costly audits—sometimes even if those
audits are imperfect, as in Bolton (1987).2 However, when audits are costly and income
is private information (so that final consumption cannot be known with certainty by all
parties), we show that penalties are necessarily limited. That being so, the usefulness of
audits rises and rises decidedly so in low states. We explain these points now in a little
more detail.
With perfect audits, the optimal contract usually employs stochastic audits with
large penalties. That way, the parties to the contract conserve on the cost of audits while
ensuring truth-telling; penalizing those who misreport and rewarding those who do not.
The level of borrowing complements these decisions: higher leverage, other things con-
stant, boosts the borrowers expected payoff but is accompanied by larger penalties for
misreporting. The upshot is that the contract delivers substantial risk-sharing: That is,
the borrower’s consumption is relatively insensitive, and the lender’s return is relatively
sensitive, to reported income. Such a contract has key properties of equity finance.
Imperfect audits complicate things. Stochastic audits and large penalties run the
risk of penalizing truth-telling agents when project returns are indeed low, while higher
leverage, ceteris paribus, increases both the expectation and the variance of borrowers’
consumption. Risk-averse borrowers at the margin fret more about the cost of having
a truthful low report overturned than they welcome the prospect of an overturned high
report. The optimal contract, therefore, has lower equilibrium borrowing relative to the
perfect audits case and lower penalties.3 Moreover, audits are employed only when the
desire for risk-sharing is especially intense, i.e., in sufficiently bad states of the world.
In other states, the borrower absorbs marginal income risk, avoiding costly, potentially
erroneous audits. Such a contract—auditing and risk-sharing with the lender only in
sufficiently bad states—is akin to a standard debt contract.
Imperfect audits, deterministic incentive regimes, and leverage
When audits are perfect but costly, there are limits on how much auditing is desirable.
Below, Theorem 1, a benchmark result in the literature, shows that the application of
2We explain in more detail later why our result differs from Bolton (1987).
3Our model is static and our penalties are just units of the consumption good, but this reasoning holds
under alternative settings where other enforcement schemes such as nonpecuniary penalties or exclusion
may be applied. When disputes are possible, even honest borrowers prefer the penalties for dishonesty to
be smaller, all else equal.
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perfect audits with certainty is wasteful; resources are saved by constructing a noisy
audit signal using a lottery. Hence, the entrepreneur’s consumption is protected from
random fluctuations in firm value in a way that resembles equity finance. Theorem
1 thus indicates why deterministic audit schemes promote the use of “imperfect” au-
dits.
In the model with costly, imperfect audit technology, entrepreneurs may experience
one of a number of out-turns for their project, and while stochastic monitoring may be
optimal when audit costs are high, things are very different when they are sufficiently
low. Stochastic auditing and a penalty may deter some, but not all, from misreporting.
In other words, the deterrence of marginally fraudulent reports does not imply the de-
terrence of major fraudulent reports; the single-crossing property is absent. So while
low-income agents might easily be deterred from misreporting, any decrease in audit
probability might encourage high-income agents fraudulently to default.
Thus, with penalties limited, higher audit probability may be part of the response,
and even as the probability of audit approaches 1, the marginal benefit of auditing can
remain strictly positive. Increases in audit probability facilitate a given insurance plan
with smaller penalties, reducing the costs of wrongful errors. So, in low states, where the
marginal utility of the entrepreneur is high, the insurance benefits from auditing out-
weigh the cost. The optimal audit probability following low reports is 1, resembling a
standard debt contract. That is the key new result proved in Theorem 2. Strictly speak-
ing, Theorem 2 shows that debt is the globally optimal contract when audit cost is low
enough. Later in the paper, optimal standard debt contracts under imperfect audits are
shown to reproduce key empirical facts of U.S. firm borrowing.
So, introducing imperfect audits encourages deterministic audit regimes. Moreover,
the interaction between leverage and costly, imperfect auditing helps underpin the find-
ing that deterministic incentive schemes can be optimal. Note that leverage and audit
probability are similar in that higher leverage increases the expectation and the variance
of consumption, as noted above; so too does a decrease in audit probabilities. Audit
costs and quality also play an important role in determining optimal leverage. When
audit costs are low, optimal leverage is such as to permit large gains from insurance or
auditing. This is what Gale and Hellwig (1985) also find in their seminal paper. When
audit quality is low, the cost of enforcement increases quickly in leverage, restricting
optimal leverage below the perfect audits case (Propositions 4 and 6).
1. Literature
Equity finance typically allows issuers to reduce repayments or dividends in bad times
while reductions in the value of assets are shared between borrowers and lenders. Debt
finance is more rigid. Debts are only reduced or discharged in bankruptcy, which follows
large falls in income or asset values. So, surely it would be better if there was less debt
and more equity?
Townsend (1979) was first to propose an explanation for the prevalence of debt con-
tracts. He shows that when a risk-averse borrower’s income is costly to verify, a standard
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debt contract is superior either to a strict debt contract, where repayments are constant
across states, or a standard equity contract, where repayments are proportional to the
borrower’s income. The difficulty with the equity contract is that to ensure the borrower
does not misreport income, the investor needs to undertake a costly audit regardless of
the report. A superior contract prescribes audits and risk-sharing only following suffi-
ciently low reports, when the borrower’s marginal utility and sensitivity to risk are high-
est. If the borrower’s income is sufficiently high, they make a fixed repayment and ab-
sorb any remaining income risk at the margin. Such a contract is the standard debt
contract that is widespread in personal and corporate loan markets.
Townsend’s analysis constrained agents to deterministic auditing regimes. However,
he suggested a better contract might employ a stochastic auditing schedule (Townsend
1979, Section 4). This conjecture was confirmed by Border and Sobel (1987) and
Mookherjee and Png (1989), who also showed agents should be rewarded following ver-
ified truthful reports. In sum, deterministic audits of low reports are unnecessary for
contract enforcement, and stochastic reports of moderate and high reports are worth-
while when the costs of audit are low. The resulting optimal contracts resemble equity
finance—repayments are contingent on marginal fluctuations in income even across
relatively high states.
However, that risk-sharing comes at a cost that is not captured in the benchmark
model. So as to ensure truth-telling when the probability of audit is low, audits that
contradict the borrower’s report can result in penalties far larger than the amount bor-
rowed. If that audit technology were to contradict a truthful report, then the prospect
of sizable wrongful penalties might render such contracts unacceptable to the borrower.
Indeed, even if the entrepreneur were merely to fear that audits may not be perfect or
that their truthful report may be disputed by the lender or bankruptcy court, they would
likely balk at a contract that leaves open the prospect of large penalties following dis-
puted reports. In short, equity-like contracts provide more insurance across states, but
may exacerbate already bad situations for a borrower. Hence the motivation of this pa-
per.
Above we noted the link between optimal leverage and audit costs. Gale and Hellwig
(1985) also studied the effects of audit costs and risk aversion on leverage in a costly state
verification model with perfect and deterministic audits. Our analysis permits stochas-
tic audit regimes, and finds alternative interactions between leverage and the contract-
ing environment: leverage has a dramatic impact on the nature of the efficient contract
in our model, and it is the joint determination of leverage and incentive regime that en-
courages debt contracts in our framework. Finally, Bolton (1987) presents a principal–
agent model where a risk-averse agent’s effort is unobservable without undertaking an
audit. He shows that even when audits are imperfect and the principal can commit,
the maximal deterrence may be optimal. That finding would seem to suggest that the
sorts of contracting results just mentioned (the desirability of stochastic audits with siz-
able penalties) is robust to the incorporation of imperfect audits and risk-averse agents.
However, we find that Bolton’s (1987) results do not go through and we explain below, in
Section 5, why that is the case.
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1.1 Further features of optimal contracts
As in Townsend’s (1979) original analysis, our model motivates an endogenous form of
limited liability.4 Following default, the optimal repayment is determined by both re-
ported income and the revealed audit signal. The severity of repayment following a dis-
puted low report varies with the parameterization of the model: under some parame-
terizations, as in our numerical example, there is considerable loan relief even following
disputed reports.
In our model, when the audit technology is relatively accurate, the costs associated
with wrongful penalties and audit errors decline. Optimal contracts involve a high de-
gree of risk sharing, with larger penalties and lower audit probabilities. Essentially, these
contracts resemble equity even if the resource costs of audit are significant. In this sense,
our framework nests both equity-like contracts and debt-like contracts as optimal un-
der various configurations. In Section 6, we draw on Herranz et al. (2015) among oth-
ers and show that under plausible parameterizations, the model can explain both debt
and equity contracts. We show that audit quality is the prime determinant as to which
type of contract is optimal. Moreover, the predicted debt contracts generate equilib-
rium relationships between interest rates, default probabilities, and leverage ratios that
are broadly consistent with empirical estimates.
1.2 Commitment
Like most studies, this paper considers an environment where the lender is able to com-
mit ex ante to an incentive regime that is wasteful ex post. That commitment may indi-
cate a concern for reputation or delegation to a specialized auditor or bankruptcy court
as in Melumad and Mookherjee (1989). Krasa and Villamil (2000) investigate what hap-
pens when lenders cannot commit to costly audits. That lack of commitment means
the revelation principle does not hold; borrowers in equilibrium misreport their income
with positive probability. It turns out that lack of commitment means that deterministic
audits may be a feature of the optimal contract. Audits can occur only if the expected
value of penalties levied following audits exceeds the audit costs. If true for a particu-
lar reported income, then this report will be audited with certainty. In short, for Krasa
and Villamil (2000), the ability to commit implies equity-like contracts are preferable,
whereas for us it does not.
1.3 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 lays out the model environment and
the nature of the auditing technology. Section 3 establishes key features of efficient con-
tracts. In Section 4, we present the perfect audits benchmark (and Theorem 1). Section 5
explores the imperfect audits case and establishes that debt contracts may be globally
4In applications of Townsend’s framework with risk neutrality, including Gale and Hellwig (1985) and
Bernanke et al. (1999), liability is limited only by the inability to pay; the lender simply takes everything
upon default.
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optimal (Theorem 2). Section 6 provides numerical analysis of the general model, show-
ing that debt is the globally optimal contract when audit quality is low enough. More-
over, the model generates empirically plausible equilibrium relationships between in-
terest spreads, default probabilities, and leverage. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
Appendix A contains formal arguments and proofs. Appendix B contains a figure that
illustrates the results of the numerical example described in Section 6.
2. The environment
We study a one period problem of a risk-averse and credit constrained entrepreneur.
The assumption of risk aversion is supported by empirical evidence. The most relevant
study for our analysis is Herranz et al. (2015), who estimate a median coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion of 15 for small business owners in the U.S. Federal Reserve Survey
of Small Business Finances. It is important to note that the assumption of risk aversion
for entrepreneurs does not directly translate into risk-averse firm decision making. The
entrepreneur’s exposure to and appetite for the firm’s risk taking is dependent on the
risk-sharing capacity of the firm’s capital structure.
The entrepreneur has access to a special technology offering high returns that are
uncorrelated with other projects undertaken in the economy. The outcome of the
project is initially private information to the entrepreneur, limiting the sharing of risk
between the entrepreneur and a financial intermediary. Contract repayments are en-
forceable, but can only be conditioned on public information. The public informa-
tion available to condition contracts includes any message sent by the entrepreneur,
m, and any audit signal produced by the audit technology, σ .5 The entrepreneur makes
a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the financial intermediary, who is well diversified
and operating in a perfectly competitive market. An optimal contract maximizes the
entrepreneur’s expected utility.6
2.1 The entrepreneur
The entrepreneur enjoys consumption at the end of the period according to U(x) :X →
R, where U ′−U ′′ > 0 and X is a closed, right unbounded interval of real numbers.7 The
entrepreneur brings wealth α into the period. Combining the entrepreneur’s wealth α
with the net funds transferred from the financial intermediary b, the project produces
the consumption good according to stochastic gross return (α+b)θ. The revenue shock
θ is drawn from a discrete distribution, θ ∈, where  is a set of possible, distinct values
of the shock θ occurring with nonzero probability. By convention, we order the values
of  as {θ1 θ2     θn}, where θi > θj if and only if and only if i > j. The unconditional
5In what follows lowercase Greek letters indicate exogenous variables and parameters, lowercase Latin
letters denote endogenous or decision variables, and uppercase calligraphic letters indicate mappings or
functions.
6An alternative formulation would be to maximize the profits of the financial intermediary subject to
satisfaction of some participation constraint of the entrepreneur. This distinction has no effect on the main
results of this paper.
7That is, either X = [X+∞) for some X ∈R or X = (−∞+∞).
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probability of revenue draw θi is denoted (θi), with
∑n
i=1(θi) = 1. By construction,
(θi) ∈ (01] ∀i ∈ {12     n}. The operator (·) is used throughout this paper to gener-
ate probability measures over its arguments.
The entrepreneur can send a public signal indicating the realized state of their
project. As we study direct truth-telling mechanisms, we can restrict the message space
as follows: message m is drawn from M = {m1m2    mn}, where a message of mi is
interpreted as a declaration that the entrepreneur has received revenue shock θi. As the
revenue shock θi is initially only observed by the entrepreneur, entrepreneurs may have
an incentive to misreport (that is, to report mi when the true revenue is θj for some j = i).
Under any truth-telling mechanism, equilibrium messaging obeys the conditional prob-
ability distributions (mi|θi)= 1 ∀i ∈ {12     n}. The message m is modeled as a reve-
lation of assets held by the entrepreneur. It is assumed that the entrepreneur can hide
assets, but cannot hypothecate assets. Formally, agents can reveal message mi if and
only if their true revenue shock is greater than or equal to θi.8
2.2 The financial intermediary
There exists a well diversified financial intermediary who can make credible commit-
ments to future actions.9 Any contract involving the entrepreneur and the financial in-
termediary is small from the perspective of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet.
The entrepreneur’s technology shock θ is uncorrelated with other shocks in the economy
and the returns of other assets/liabilities of the financial intermediary’s balance sheet. It
follows that the financial intermediary is risk neutral with respect to claims contingent
on the entrepreneur’s individual specific technology shock θ.
Financial intermediaries operates in a perfectly competitive market. Their oppor-
tunity cost of funds is given by ρ; any contract offering an expected return on possibly
state contingent loans exceeding ρ is acceptable. This condition is formalized below in
Constraint 3. The opportunity cost of funds could be thought of as some combination
of the interest rate paid by a risk-free bond, the interest rate paid by the intermediary to
his/her deposit holders, and the intermediary’s administrative costs.
The following two assumptions ensure that there are positive, finite gains from trade
between the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary.
Assumption 1. Expected project returns exceed the financial intermediary’s opportu-
nity cost of funds,
∑
θ∈(θ)θ > ρ.
Assumption 2. In the lowest state, project returns are lower than the financial inter-
mediary’s opportunity cost of funds, θ1 < ρ.
8The revelation of assets during the message reporting relaxes the constraint set of the optimal contract
problem.
9Efficient contracts typically require commitment on behalf of the financial intermediary. One might
think of this as sustained either through the intermediary’s concern for his/her reputation or through dele-
gation to a specialist bailiff or auditor as in Melumad and Mookherjee (1989).
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Assumption 1 ensures that there are economic gains from diverting resources to the
entrepreneur’s project, even when the entrepreneur has access to a deposit facility at
the bank that yields a risk-free return equal to the bank’s opportunity cost of funds, ρ.
Assumption 1 is strong enough to ensure that b > −α. Assumption 2 specifies that the
entrepreneurs’ projects are risky. In bad states, a project yields lower returns than the
risk-free asset. Assumption 2 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence
of finite leverage optimal contracts.
2.3 Audits
There exists an audit technology T (κS(θ)) that is characterized by an audit cost param-
eter κ and a mapping S(θ) from realized revenues θ to distributions of audit signals σ .
The resource cost of an audit is the product κ(α+ b); that is, audit costs are linearly in-
creasing in the assets controlled by the entrepreneur. Following an audit, the audit tech-
nology produces a signal σ ∼ S(θ). This signal σ is assumed to be drawn from a discrete
set of potential audit signals denoted by . The action to undertake an audit is common
knowledge and so is the signal provided, σ . The entrepreneur knows if (s)he has been
audited and, if so, knows the result of the audit. The audit technology is exogenous: we
do not allow agents to choose between competing technologies.10
The signal produced by the audit technology maps from the space of realized shocks
θ as follows: if there is no audit, the audit signal is the empty set, σ = ∅; if there is an
audit, the audit signal is drawn from the set . The cardinality of the set of possible
signals || does not necessarily equal the cardinality of the set of possible revenue out-
turns ||(= n). Also, for now, we do not require an ordering of the elements of the set of
possible signals, . The probability of revenue shock θ conditional upon audit signal σ
is denoted (θ|σ).
An audit strategy is a mapping from messages to audit probabilities and is denoted
Q :m→ [01]. Under truth-telling mechanisms, we can restrict our attention to reports
m ∈ {m1m2    mn} and we denote qi = Q(mi). It is assumed that an audit strategy
can be agreed and committed to ex ante. Audit strategies are defined in contracts, and
implemented ex post by the financial intermediary. The probability of the couplet (σθ)
conditional on the probability of audit q is denoted (θσ |q).
The following definition specifies what is meant by the terms “perfect audit” and
“imperfect audits.”
Definition 1. (i) Imperfect Audits. An audit technology is imperfect if and only if there
exists some couplet (θiσ) ∈× such that (θiσ |1) > 0 and (θi|σ) ∈ (01).
(ii) Perfect Audits. An audit technology is perfect if and only if for all couplets (θiσ) ∈
× the following statement holds: if (θiσ |1) > 0, then (θi|σ) ∈ {01}.
10This would be an interesting extension of the model. In particular, it may be the case that the optimal
auditing technology used to enforce equity contracts differs from that used to enforce debt contracts. This
may help us understand the coexistence of debt and equity finance issued by individual firms.
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Audits are imperfect since in some states, following the audit, the signal can merely
indicate how likely a particular revenue draw was. Note that under perfect audits, it is
possible that multiple audit signals perfectly predict a single revenue shock. That is, it
is possible that there exist two distinct signals σσ ′ ∈  with the property that for some
θi, (θiσ |1) > 0 and (θiσ ′|1) > 0, and (θi|σ) = (θi|σ ′) = 1. In this example, the
revenue shock θi does not predict a unique audit signal with certainty (by Bayes’ law,
(σ |θi) ∈ (01)). However, the audit signals σ , σ ′ do predict a specific revenue shock θi
with certainty. It is the latter that matters for contract enforcement.
3. Contracts
We have already described two elements of financial contracts: b is the amount of real
resources transferred from the financial intermediaries to entrepreneurs at the begin-
ning of the period to invest in the project; Q is the audit strategy that specifies the
probabilities that audits will occur conditional upon messages m announced by the en-
trepreneur following the private realization of the revenue shock θ.
The third element of a financial contract is the repayment function. The repayment
function maps message and audit signal pairs to real transfers of resources from the
entrepreneur to the financial intermediary at the end of the period, Z : M × σ → R.
This repayment does not need to be strictly positive.11 Under truth-telling direct mech-
anisms, we denote Z(miσ) by zi(σ). The fourth element of the financial contract
is the consumption allocation function. The consumption function maps the rev-
enue state, the message, and the audit signal to final consumption of the entrepreneur
X :  × M × σ → R. The consumption allocation function is denoted by X (θmσ),
where the ordering of the tuple (θmσ) replicates the timing of the model; first the en-
trepreneur receives revenue shock θ, then reports message m, before the audit signal σ
is revealed. We typically focus our analysis on audit strategies Q, borrowing b, and re-
payment allocations Z ; the consumption allocations X are uniquely determined by the
repayment allocations and borrowing by the budget constraint, which is (1) below.
Definition 2. A contract is a tuple C = (bQZX ) that is agreed at time zero and is
common knowledge. A contract is a combination of an amount of resources transferred
from the financial intermediary to the entrepreneur for investment, b, an audit strategy,
Q, a repayment function Z , and a consumption allocation function X .
The motivation for this paper is the search for environments where optimal con-
tracts resemble standard debt contracts, which we define as follows.
Definition 3. We specify the following two benchmark classes of debt contracts.
(a) A noncontingent debt contract is a contract with constant repayments across all
states and messages zi(σ)= zj(σ ′) ∀mi, mj ∈M , σσ ′ ∈ .
11As pointed out by Bolton (1986), restricting repayments to be nonnegative would not affect the optimal
allocations, subject to an adjustment to the model to allow for the entrepreneur to hold collateral in the
form of risk-free deposits.
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(b) A standard debt contract has the following two properties: (i) the contract spec-
ifies a constant repayment when either the entrepreneur’s message is equal to or
above some threshold mk,
zi(σ)= zj
(
σ ′
) ∀mimj ∈ {mkmk+1    mn}σσ ′ ∈ ;
(ii) reports below the threshold are audited, qi = 1 ∀i < k.
We refer to the reporting of a message mi where i < k as default.
Note that debt contracts in our model do not restrict the entrepreneur to zero con-
sumption following default. In fact, in the examples that we consider, entrepreneurs
enjoy strictly positive consumption in all circumstances, even following a default. This
positive consumption could represent income already paid to the entrepreneur during
the life of the project.
3.1 Constraints
Contracts in our framework are subject to four classes of constraints. The first class of
constraints is budget constraints.
Constraint 1 (Budget). State contingent budget constraints are specified as
X (θimjσ)= (α+ b)θi −Z(mjσ) ∀(miσθj) ∈M ×× (1)
Constraint 2 (Audit probability). Audit probability constraints are specified as
Q(m) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M (2)
1−Q(m) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M (3)
Constraint 3 (Financial intermediary’s participation). The participation constraint is
specified as∑
m∈M
f (m)
∑
σ
f
(
σ |mQ(m))Z(mσ)≥ bρ+ ∑
m∈M
f (m)Q(m)(α+ b)κ (4)
where the probability measures f (·) are constructed from the financial intermediary’s
information set.
Constraint 4 (Incentive compatibility). Contracts are referred to as incentive compat-
ible if and only if the following constraints hold:
mi ∈ argmax
m
∑
σ

(
θiσ |Q(m)
)U(θimσ) ∀i ∈ {12     n} (5)
We typically refer to (1) as BCijσ . Equation (1) shows the revenue received by the
entrepreneur from his/her project. Following the repayment Z(mσ), the remainder
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available for the entrepreneur to consume is X (θmσ). We frequently use the short-
hand notation U(θmσ) :=U(X (θmσ)) and U ′(θmσ) :=U ′(X (θmσ)).
The second class of constraints is the set of bounds on audit probabilities.
The left hand side of (4) captures the expected repayment constructed from the fi-
nancial intermediary’s information set f . The right hand side reflects the opportunity
cost of the intermediary’s funds, ρ, and probable audit costs. Under any contract, the
financial intermediary must forecast the entrepreneurs messaging strategy to form an
expectation of repayment. The revelation principle holds in our setting. This means that
there exists an optimal contract under which the entrepreneur weakly prefers truthfully
to reveal his/her true θ in all states. We refer to contracts that induce truth-telling as
truth-telling contracts. Under any truth-telling contract, (mi|θi) = 1 ∀i ∈ {12     n}.
Therefore, under truth-telling we can rewrite Constraint 3 as
∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)zi(σ)− bρ−
n∑
i=1
(θi)qi(α+ b)κ≥ 0 (6)
We typically refer to (6) as PC.
It is useful to deconstruct the Incentive Compatibility constraint into a set of con-
straints that compare individual pairs of reports. That is, a contract is incentive com-
patible if for all state pairs (θi θj), an entrepreneur who receives true return θi weakly
prefers to report mi over mj . This pairwise formulation of the Incentive Compatibility
constraint is equivalent to (5) and is formalized by∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)−
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)U(θimjσ)≥ 0
∀i ∈ {12     n} j < i (7)
We typically refer to (7) as ICCij for truthful report mi and misreport mj . There are two
challenges to enforcement in the model under imperfect audits. First, penalties may be
wrongfully applied to truth-telling agents. Second, even when the audit signal has iden-
tified a fraudulent report, the financial intermediary may remain uncertain of the true
income of the misreporting agent, and may therefore be unable to impose a maximal
penalty. So we ensure that all penalty repayment allocations are payable by any agent
who may be charged this allocation. In other words, for Constraint 4 to be well defined,
it must be the case that consumption allocations both on and off the equilibrium path
are in the domain of the utility function:
X (θimjσ) ∈X ∀
{
(i jσ)|(θiσ |qj) > 0∧ j ≤ i
}

Of course, this becomes redundant when the domain of the utility function is un-
bounded below (that is, when Dom(U) = R), in which case any agent is able to make
any repayment regardless of assets.
Before continuing, we define the concept of a feasible contract, and the active set of
constraints. We use this below in the analysis of the optimization problem. A contract C
is feasible if and only if the constraints BCijσ , PC, and ICCij are satisfied for all i, j, σ .
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Let C be a feasible contract. The active set of constraints, denoted A(C), is the set of
binding constraints,
BCijσ ∈ A(C)
PC ∈ A(C) ⇐⇒ PC = 0
ICCij ∈ A(C) ⇐⇒ ICCij = 0
3.2 Optimal contracts
Optimal contracts are formalized by Programme 1. We assume that the optimal contract
maximizes the entrepreneurs’ utility conditional on participation of the financial inter-
mediary and truth-telling. Note that there may be welfare maximizing contracts that are
not classed as optimal under this definition, because they do not induce truth-telling as
a dominant reporting strategy. By the revelation principle, we know that there exist wel-
fare maximizing contracts that do induce truth-telling, and our definition of optimality
restricts our attention to these truth-telling contracts.
Programme 1. A contract is optimal if and only if it maximixes the entrepreneur’s utility
subject to feasibility
max
C
∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)
subject to (1), (2), (3), (6), and (7).
The first order conditions of Programme 1 do not always provide sufficient, or even
necessary, conditions for optimal contracts. Sufficiency is broken as a result of the non-
convexity of the constraint set. The necessity of the first order conditions of Programme
1 is also not guaranteed; when there exists some i such that qi ∈ {01}, there can exist
optimal contracts that do not satisfy the first order condition for audit probability qi.
These results are formalized as follows.
Remark 1. The first order conditions of Programme 1 specify neither sufficient nor nec-
essary conditions for optimal contracts.
The proof of Remark 1 along with the proofs of all other results are contained in
Appendix A. Constraints 1 and 2 are affine in the choice variables Z , Q, X , and b. Con-
straints 3 and 4 are nonconvex.12 Focussing on the subproblem of determining utility
12Furthermore, in contrast with Grossman and Hart (1983) and Bolton (1987), rewriting the problem in
terms of utility allocations does not convexify the subproblem of optimizing repayment allocations and
borrowing conditional upon a given audit strategy. To see this, consider the substitution X (θmσ) =
ξ(U(θmσ)), where ξ = U−1(X (θmσ)). The function ξ is convex, and after substitution appears in the
budget constraints (1), which become nonconvex. In Programme 1, the budget constraints are equality
constraints: they both constrain the consumption of truth-telling agents from above, and constrain the
punishments imposed on misreporting agents from below. The introduction of any nonlinearity into the
budget constraints breaks the convexity of these constraints.
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allocations and the initial transfer of resources to the entrepreneur, we can derive nec-
essary optimality conditions. These optimality conditions are presented next.
Proposition 1. Let C be a globally optimal contract that satisfies the following necessary
conditions.
Repayments Z(miσ) satisfy
U ′(θimiσ)
λ
= 1
1+
∑
k
μik
[
1+
∑
j
μji
(θj|σ)
(θi|σ)
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ
]
(8)
for all (miσ). The initial transfer of resources to the entrepreneur b satisfies
∑
i
(θi)
[
θi − q(θi)κ
]− ρ=∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)
[∑
j
μji
(θj|σ)
(θi|σ)
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ
(θj − θi)
]
(9)
for all i ∈ {12     n} and
λ > 0 μji ≥ 0 ∀i jk
Equation (8) presents the optimality condition for repayment zi(σ). The left hand
side is the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in state (θiσ) to the shadow
cost of the participation constraint, λ. This ratio is a marginal rate of substitution from
expected consumption marginal utility to realized consumption marginal utility and is
equal to 1 under perfect information. This marginal rate of substitution is decreasing
in
∑
j μij , the sum of shadow costs of binding incentive constraints in which the repay-
ment zi(σ) enters in the first term of the constraint (7). In other words, this term cap-
tures the cost of ensuring that an agent who earns θi reports mi truthfully. All else equal,
this cost of ensuring truthful reporting is high when the marginal utility of consumption
is low relative to expected marginal utility.
The term
∑
j μji
(θj |σ)
(θi|σ)
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ captures the cost of ensuring that agents who earn
θj do not report mi. The sum
∑
j μji is not dependent on σ and captures the shadow
costs of binding incentive constraints in which repayments zi(·) enter in the second
term of the constraint (7). Conditional upon the signal σ , these incentive costs are in-
creasing in the marginal likelihood ratio
(θj |σ)
(θi|σ) . When this marginal likelihood ratio is
close to unity, the signal σ leaves the lender unable to detect misreporting by agents
who earn θj and report mi. The final term,
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ , captures the marginal increase
in utility of a misreporting agent who receives θj and reports mi, conditional upon the
audit signal σ . This marginal utility is normalized by the shadow cost of the participa-
tion constraint, λ. All else equal, when this marginal utility is low, a marginal increase in
zi(σ) has a small increase in the value of misreporting mi for an agent who receives θi
and, therefore, has a small impact on incentive compatibility.
Equation (9) captures the optimality condition for the initial amount of resources
transferred from the financial intermediary to the entrepreneur, b. The left hand side
captures the net contribution of a marginal increase in b to expected consumption.
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The first term
∑
i (θi)θi is the expected per unit increase in revenue. The second term∑
i (θi)q(θi)κ is the expected increase in audit costs and ρ is the financial intermedi-
ary’s opportunity cost of funds. The right hand side captures the incentive costs of an
increase in b. The term
∑
iσ (θiσ |qi) takes the expectation over states (θiσ), condi-
tional upon the audit strategy Q(m). The sum ∑j μji captures the shadow costs of the
binding incentive constraints relating to entrepreneurs receiving revenue θj who weakly
prefer reporting mj over mi. These shadow costs are scaled by three factors: First, the
marginal likelihood ratio
(θj |σ)
(θi|σ) captures the ability of the lender to identify misreport-
ing agents who earn θj and report mi; second, the term
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ captures the marginal
increase in the value of an agent who receives θj and misreports mi conditional upon
audit signal σ ; third, the term (θj − θi) captures the rate at which a rise in borrowing
increases the absolute risk across revenue states.
Corollary 1. Let C be a globally optimal contract. The repayment terms of contract C
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) A repayment allocation Z(miσ) is contingent on the audit signal σ only if the
messagemi enters on the right hand side of a binding incentive constraint. That is,
∃σσ ′ s.t. Z(miσ) =Z
(
miσ
′) =⇒ ∃θj s.t. ICCji ∈A(C)
(ii) Under nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, if the incentive constraint ICCij is
binding, then repayments are strictly increasing in the conditional likelihood ratio
of θj with respect to θi. That is,
A′(x)≤ 0∧ ICCji ∈A(C)∧

(
θj|σ ′
)

(
θi|σ ′
) > (θj|σ)
(θi|σ) =⇒ Z
(
miσ
′)>Z(miσ)
whereA(x) := −U ′′(x)U ′(x) is the Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
Corollary 1 formalizes two properties of optimal repayments. First, any repayment
that appears only on the left hand side of binding incentive constraints—this includes
the highest repayment θn—is not contingent on audit signals. Increases in the uncer-
tainty of consumption following report i decrease expected utility for agents earning θi
and also decrease the incentive for these agents to report income truthfully. These costs
can be compensated for if the increased uncertainty deters false reports from agents
with true income greater than i. But if all incentive constraints ICCji are nonbinding,
then there is no benefit attainable from uncertainty in repayments following report mi.
Second, if a repayment allocation is present on the right hand side of a binding incentive
constraint, repayments are increasing in the conditional likelihood ratio of misreporting
j with respect to truthfully reporting i. The conditional likelihood ratio is the marginal
rate of transformation of consumption for misreporting agents with respect to truth-
telling agents. When the conditional likelihood ratio is high, the disincentive effect of
high repayments is large relative to the direct effect on expected utility.
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Proposition 2. Let C = (QZX  b) be a globally optimal contract. Contract C has the
following properties:
(i) The financial intermediary’s participation constraint is binding: PC ∈A(C).
(ii) The highest possible report is never audited: Q(mn)= 0.
(iii) There exists a binding incentive constraint: ∃i j s.t. ICCij ∈A(C).
Let the audit strategyQ∗(m) be taken as given and let the probabilities of all revenue states
be positive conditional upon any audit signal ((θi|σ) > 0 ∀θiσ).
(iv) Conditional upon Q∗, under the optimal allocation of repayments Z and borrow-
ing b, there exists a binding incentive constraint ∃i j s.t. ICCij ∈A(C).
Proposition 2 characterizes restrictions on the active set of constraints under opti-
mal contracts. Part (i) states that the financial intermediary’s participation constraint is
binding; the entrepreneur’s utility can be increased if the financial intermediary’s par-
ticipation constraint is not binding. Part (ii) states that audits of the highest reports are
always wasteful; this follows from Corollary 1(i). Part (iii) states that any optimal con-
tract features a binding incentive constraint; any deviation from this would mean that
costly audits are being undertaken wastefully. Part (iv) goes further. Under the assump-
tion that any message–audit signal pair could be consistent with truth-telling, there ex-
ists a binding incentive constraint when repayments and leverage are chosen optimally,
regardless of the given audit strategy. The condition ((θi|σ) > 0 ∀θiσ) is a stronger
condition than imperfect audits, and severely restricts the ability of the financial inter-
mediary to detect misreporting agents.
4. Perfect audits
In the Introduction, we stated that the interaction between leverage and costly, imperfect
audits underpins the optimality of deterministic contracts. Before establishing that and
other results, it is insightful to analyze the case of perfect audits. Theorem 1 restates
Mookherjee and Png’s (1989) finding that debt contracts are not optimal. Moreover, we
go on to show that optimal leverage is unbounded for reasonable parameter values.
Theorem 1 (Mookherjee and Png 1989, Proposition 1). Under perfect audits (δ(θi|σk) ∈
{01} ∀ik), any optimal contract without certain immiseration following truthful reports
(
∑
σ (θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ) > U ∀i) cannot include certain auditing of any report. That
is,Q(θ) < 1 ∀θ.
We provide a proof of Theorem 1 similar to Mookherjee and Png (1989). However,
we place a somewhat different interpretation on it that proves useful in the next section.
The proof works by starting with a contract with certain auditing, Q(θi) = 1 for some i.
We show that the marginal audit following report mi can be replaced by a lottery that
replicates the repayments following audits for truth-telling agents receiving true return
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θi, while retaining incentive compatibility and relaxing the lender’s participation con-
straint. Our proof shows the value of weak audit signals and provides some intuition
over their role in promoting standard debt contracts. Under perfect audits, an agent
forced to audit with certainty conditional upon a given report mi would wish to reduce
costs by weakening the quality of the audit signal, even via a naïve strategy of introduc-
ing a lottery between the true audit signal and an uninformative signal.
So by Theorem 1, one sees that for any fixed level of audit costs, optimal contracts
under perfect audits do not apply certain audits following any report (q∗i < 1). Proposi-
tion 3 explores how this result relates to audit costs. As audit costs fall, we would expect
optimal audit probabilities to increase. Proposition 3 states that even as audit costs ap-
proach 0, optimal audit probabilities approach strictly interior values. It follows that
certain audits and standard debt contracts cannot be explained by low audit costs.
Proposition 3. Under perfect audits, as audit costs approach 0, optimal audit proba-
bilities approach values strictly less than 1: limκ→0+ q∗i ∈ [01).
Proposition 3 shows that the cost of contract enforcement under perfect audits is
low. Within costly state verification models, leverage acts as a substitute for reductions
in auditing: an increase in leverage increases both the expected consumption and the
consumption risk of agents. The following proposition shows the importance of this
substitutability for optimal contracts.
Proposition 4. If audits are perfect (δ(θi|σk) ∈ {01} ∀ik) and sufficiently inexpensive
(κ < E(θ)−ρ), and projects enjoy constant returns to scale, optimal external finance con-
tracts do not exist; limiting external finance contracts approach infinite leverage and in-
finite entrepreneurial consumption.
So parameter values are important for equilibrium out-turns and later we discuss
this more fully. For now we note that estimates of the direct costs of auditing range be-
tween 001 and 006 of assets.13 While it is not straightforward to estimate the marginal
return on assets for entrepreneurs, we can obtain estimates of the average return on as-
sets for entrepreneurs: Herranz et al. (2015) find a mean annual gross return on assets of
130 for small firms in the 1993 Survey of Small Business Finances, and a median annual
gross return on assets of 109 for the same sample. They also estimate the lenders’ an-
nualized gross opportunity cost of funds at 1012. Our model predicts that these values
are not consistent with optimal leverage under perfect audits.
5. Imperfect audits
The previous section showed that under perfect audits, it is never optimal to audit a
single report mi with certainty (Theorem 1). In proving this result, we construct a wel-
fare improving perturbation that bundles the resource-costly perfect audit signal with a
13See, for example, Warner and Gruber (1977), Weiss (1990), and Altman (1984).
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lottery; this bundle can be thought of as a lower cost but imperfect audit technology. Un-
der the perturbed contract, the new imperfect audit technology is applied with certainty
following report mi.
Indeed, under imperfect audits, certain auditing of an individual report can be op-
timal. Optimal contracts can even take the form of standard debt (Theorem 2). Even if
the audit probability is high, any further increase in the audit probability does increase
the set of feasible consumption allocations available to the entrepreneur. Under im-
perfect audits, increasing the probability of audit defrays the incentive costs of contract
enforcement more widely. This increases risk-sharing across states.
Assumption 3. The probabilities of all revenue states are positive conditional upon any
audit signal, ((θi|σ) > 0∀θiσ).
Within this section, we assume that, conditional upon any given audit signal, all
revenue states are possible (Assumption 3). This assumption is sufficient to prove the
existence of optimal contracts (Proposition 5), the existence of optimal debt contracts
(Theorem 2), and the presence of an upper bound on leverage (Proposition 6).
Proposition 5. Optimal contracts exist.
In contrast to the case of perfect audits (Proposition 4), Proposition 5 implies inte-
rior optimal leverage and consumption allocations. Proposition 5 may be contrasted
with the principal–agent model studied by Bolton (1987, Proposition 4). Bolton showed
that in the principal–agent model, imperfect signals are not sufficient to deter maximal
penalties following overturned reports: optimal contracts do not exist, as any contract
can be improved upon by lowering consumption closer to zero following overturned re-
ports. With hidden income, driving down consumption payoffs to induce truth-telling
eventually loses some of its effectiveness compared to principal–agent models in which
consumption allocations are specified directly. Hidden income cushions the marginal
incentive effects of high contractual repayments.14
Theorem 2. When κ is sufficiently small, optimal debt contracts are standard debt con-
tracts.
Theorem 2 presents a sufficient condition for standard debt to be optimal under im-
perfect audits. Standard debt contracts combine the certain auditing of low reported
revenues with no audits of high reported revenues. Certain auditing of report mj re-
quires that the following incentive constraint adapted from (7) must be binding for
some θi: ∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)≥
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj = 1)U(θimjσ) (10)
14Within our proof, the equation that captures this distinction is (14). When there is hidden income
((α+ bs)(θj − θi)), (14) holds and the limit of the sequence is zero. When there is no hidden income, this
limit may be nonzero.
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Under perfect auditing, the signal σ reveals the true income θi with certainty. The sum
on the right hand side of (10) becomes a single value U(θimjσ = θi) and this value can
be set equal to or arbitrarily close to the lower support of the range of the utility function
U without harming any truth-telling agent. This means that the incentive constraint will
be slack for any allocation that does not immiserate with certainty agents who truthfully
report mi.15
Under imperfect auditing, the lottery on the right hand side of (10) remains, and
repayment allocations Z(mjσ) may affect both truth-telling and misreporting agents.
Utility allocations on the right hand side, U(θimjσ), are bounded below by what is
acceptable ex ante to entrepreneurs who know they may be punished for misreporting
ex post. In addition, repayments are bounded by the inability of the audit technology
to reveal the true income of misreporting agents, even when the audit signal can detect
whether they have misreported their income.16
This explains how the marginal value of audits can remain positive as the probabil-
ity of audit approaches 1. At the same time, lower quality audits increase the costs of
enforcing risk-sharing contracts. We show in our proof contained in Appendix A and in
the numerical simulations studied in Section 6 that optimal contracts under imperfect
audits reduce the probability of audit to 0 across high revenue states, where the value
of risk-sharing is low; optimal contracts increase the probability of audit to 1 across low
revenue states, where the value of risk-sharing is high.
We saw in Section 4 that when audits are perfect and sufficiently inexpensive, the
optimal leverage ratio is infinite. Consider (9), the first order necessary condition for
borrowing b. The right hand side of the equation captures the incentive costs of in-
creasing leverage. When audits are perfect, sufficiently high audit probabilities leave all
incentive constraints slack and all Kuhn–Tucker multipliers μji = 0. When audits are
imperfect, deterministic audit strategies do not guarantee slack incentive constraints.
Proposition 6 provides sufficient conditions under which optimal leverage is bounded
above.
Proposition 6. Nonnegative consumption in all truth-telling states requires that lever-
age is bounded above as
α+ b
α
≤ ρ
ρ−
(
θ1 −
∑
i
(θi)Q(θi)κ
) 
15It is possible to make (10) hold by introducing an exogenous limited liability constraint. This effectively
imposes a lower bound on the support of the range of U . However, for the incentive constraint to bind with
certain auditing, the consumption allocations of truth-telling agents would also need to be constrained by
the limited liability constraint.
16In the example we use to prove Theorem 2, the first channel is important: entrepreneurs write con-
tracts that limit ex post penalties, as these penalties are wrongfully applied to truth-tellers with positive
probability. In the numerical example we present in Section 6, the second channel is important: the audit
technology can correctly identify misreporting agents with positive probability. The optimal standard debt
contracts do not need to punish truth-tellers, but they are unable to impose maximal penalties on high
income misreporting agents, as the audit technology does not precisely reveal the true income of misre-
porting agents.
Theoretical Economics 14 (2019) Disputes, debt, and equity 905
Proposition 6 shows the effect of imperfect audits on optimal leverage. Under im-
perfect audits, the possibility of low out-turns has an important effect on the limits of
leverage. As leverage increases, revenue in the low state approaches 0 by Assumption 2.
Positive probabilities of revenue states conditional upon any audit signal comprise a
stronger condition than imperfect audits, and imply that any “penalty” repayment al-
location is occasionally wrongfully applied to truth-telling agents under contracts with
positive probability auditing.
6. Numerical example
In this section, we simulate a numerical version of the model that approximates the
general model developed earlier and allows us to compare the predictions of the model
with stylized facts about small business borrowing. It also serves to highlight the main
trade-offs that determine the choice between debt and equity. The main finding of our
numerical exercise is that when audit signals are weakly correlated with true incomes,
standard debt contracts emerge as optimal. When audit signals are highly correlated
with true incomes, optimal contracts resemble equity.
Audits play two important roles in costly state verification contracts. First, as empha-
sized by Townsend (1979), audits of low reports allow contract enforcers to punish misre-
porting agents with high penalties. Second, as emphasized by Border and Sobel (1987),
audits allow contract enforcers to reward truth-telling agents with low repayments after
truthful reports; truth-tellers want to be audited. Our numerical example shows both of
these mechanisms at work. When audits are high quality, even high reports are audited,
and verified truthful reports are rewarded with low repayments. The second mechanism
requires interior audit signals: when audit strategies are deterministic, there is no mean-
ingful distinction between repayments following an unaudited report and repayments
following an audit consistent with the reported income. In our computed example, the
first mechanism is dominant when the audit signal has low quality. Audit strategies are
deterministic, with certain audits following low reports. Audit signals are used to punish
misreporting agents. The second mechanism emerges as the audit signal quality im-
proves. High reports are audited and truthful reports are rewarded with low repayments
relative to unaudited reports.
6.1 Solution strategy
The model is solved numerically for an example with 10 revenue states. For the main
numerical simulations, we hold the amount of resources transferred to the entrepreneur
b constant to focus on the link between optimal audit strategies and audit quality. This
leaves us with n + n(l + 1) choice variables to be determined, where n is the number
of revenue states and l is the number of signal states.17 It follows that in the perfect
audits version of our model, there are 10+ 10(10+ 1) = 120 choice variables. Given the
17The audit strategy Q(m) comprises |M| = || = n elements; the repayment strategy Z(mσ) comprises
|M| × | + 1| = n(l + 1) states, where the l + 1 possible signals include the l signals drawn from the audit
technology and the uninformative, null signal {∅} drawn when no audit occurs.
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nonconvexity of Programme 1, the large number of choice variables poses a challenge
for combining speed with numerical stability. The algorithm we describe below takes
advantage of parallel processing when we sample over candidate audit strategies.
The solution algorithm splits the problem into two loops. The inner loop solves for
the optimal repayment allocations Z conditional upon a candidate solution for the au-
dit strategy Q. This inner loop is solved using a feasible directions search algorithm.
The outer loop solves for the optimal audit strategy Q using a combination of global
sampling and local perturbation routines. The global sampling routine provides assur-
ance that the solutions found are globally optimal, while the local perturbation routine
improves precision.
6.2 Functional forms
Gross returns θ are drawn from a discrete uniform grid unif{θ1 θ10} with 10 draws. The
probabilities π(θi) are drawn from the binomial distribution B(9p). The return draw
can be considered to be a function of smaller positive and negative draws, consistent
with standard interpretations of the binomial distribution as the sum of “good” draws
from an urn with replacement. The auditor is assumed to observe a subset of the in-
dividual draws that determine gross returns. Audits are perfect when the auditor ob-
serves all individual draws and thereby can observe θ with certainty. Audits are imper-
fect when the auditor observes a strict subset of the individual draws that determine
gross returns.18 Initial net worth α is a scaling parameter, and is set at 100.
The entrepreneur’s coefficient of relative risk aversion (−cU
′′(c)
U ′(c) ) is assumed to be
constant, with utility taking the functional form U(c) = c1−γ1−γ . Under this functional
form and parameterization, there is no optimal contract under perfect auditing; allo-
cations approach arbitrarily close to first-best allocations. When γ ≥ 1, limc→0+ U(c) =
−∞. Given any audit strategy with strictly positive audits in all states (Q(m) subject to
Q(m) > 0 ∀m), maximal penalties ensure that all incentive compatibility constraints are
relaxed, regardless of allocations and the level of individual audit probabilities. It follows
that we can always perturb Q to reduce audit probabilities in all states, retaining incen-
tive compatibility and expected utility while relaxing the participation constraint of the
financial intermediary.
6.3 Calibration
Table 1 presents our preferred calibration of the model. For the matched parameters, the
calibration procedure minimizes the distance from the model parameters to the avail-
able empirical estimates. For the unmatched parameters, the calibration procedure se-
lects parameters that generate predicted values for optimal borrowing, probability of
default, and credit spreads that are close to the empirical estimates. The probability of
default is defined as the probability of a revenue state occurring that elicits a positive
18For example, let gross returns be affected by both input costs and input quality. It may be the case that
the audit signal σ could reveal input costs with certainty, but not input quality.
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Table 1. Calibration.
Description Data Model
Unmatched parameters
Return bounds, {θ1 θ10} {058162}
Distribution parameter, p 0435
Number of signals, || 3
CRRA coefficient, γ 05
Matched parameters
Opportunity cost, ρ 101 1012
Audit costs, κ (001006) 0012
Matched predicted moments
Borrowing, b∗ 449 450
Probability of default 0040 0047
Credit spread 0039 0017
probability of audit under the optimal audit strategy. The credit spread is defined as the
ratio of the repayment following the highest revenue report to the amount borrowed, b∗.
Data sources are as follows. Borrowing is taken from the U.S. Federal Reserve Z1 ta-
bles.19 Audit costs are set within the bounds of empirical estimates of the direct cost
of bankruptcy as a share of firm assets between 001 and 006.20 The financial inter-
mediary’s opportunity cost of funds and the probability of default are drawn from the
estimates of Herranz et al. (2015). The interest rate spread is constructed from interest
expense and liability data captured by the U.S. Federal Reserve Z1 tables. From these
figures, we can construct approximate annualized loan interest rate spreads of 351%
and 435%, where the former estimate constructs the opportunity cost of funds ρ from
financial institutions’ interest expense and the latter estimate equates the opportunity
cost of funds to the London Interbank Offered Rate.21
6.4 Results
Result 1. Themodel predicts standard debt contracts as globally optimal contractswhen
the quality of the audit technology is low.
Panels (A), (B), and (C) of Figure 1 present the importance of audit quality for the
optimality of standard debt contracts. To make the comparison as straightforward as
possible and to allow comparison with the perfect audits case, the amount of borrowing
has been held constant across audit strategies for panels (A), (B), and (C) at 45, which is
19B.104 Balance Sheet of Nonfinancial Noncorporate Business, FL114104006 Debt as a percentage of net
worth, 2016 Q4.
20See Warner and Gruber (1977), Weiss (1990), and Altman (1984).
21All values are for 2015 (usd billions). Nonfinancial noncorporate business: interest paid, 2440
(FA116130001); total loans, 4,7468 (FL114123005). Financial business: interest paid, 1,4471 (FA796130001);
total liabilities, 88,6762 (FL794194005); 12 month LIBOR 079% (St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED Database:
USD12MD156N).
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the optimal level of borrowing for the calibrated model. When the audit technology pro-
duces a weak signal, standard debt contracts are optimal. When the number of signal
states is 1, the audit signal is uninformative and the optimal contract is noncontingent
debt with no auditing. When the number of signal states is 2 or 3, the optimal contract
is standard debt, auditing low reports with certainty and not auditing any moderate or
high reports. As the number of signal states increases, optimal contracts start to resem-
ble equity contracts. When the audit signal is perfect, contracts are able to implement
allocations arbitrarily close to the first-best allocations.
Result 2. The model predicts an optimal leverage ratio that is consistent with empirical
estimates; the optimality of standard debt is consistent with optimal leverage choices.
Panel (F) displays the relationship between leverage and welfare for our calibration.
This calibration generates the predictions that the optimal financial contract is a stan-
dard debt contract, and that optimal leverage ratios and default probabilities are very
close to empirical estimates (Table 1). Panel (F) also presents the relationship between
leverage and welfare restricting agents to noncontingent contracts. In contrast to opti-
mal contracts, noncontingent contracts result in much lower optimal leverage and wel-
fare gains from financial trade. This is the case despite the fact that the optimal contract
involves only auditing and state contingency in 47% of out-turns (47% being the prob-
ability of default).
Panels (D) and (E) show for our calibration the relationships between welfare, opti-
mal borrowing, and audit quality. Under our calibration, perfect audits (|σ | = 10) result
in infinite leverage and infinite welfare for the entrepreneur. When the audit technology
is noisy, improvements in the audit technology have large effects on optimal borrowing
and when borrowing is chosen optimally, they have large effects on welfare.
7. Discussion
Standard debt contracts can be the optimal form of external finance contracts when
contract enforcement is uncertain due to noisy audit signals. Supporting truth-telling
under stochastic audit strategies requires large penalties. When there is no guarantee
that these penalties are fairly applied, these contracts will not be acceptable to risk-
averse entrepreneurs. The resulting efficient contracts audit, consequently, only on low
reports, but likely audit low reports with certainty. As a result, only small penalties are
required to ensure truth-telling in equilibrium. In fact, the penalty following a disputed
report in an optimal debt contract is typically very close to fully repaying the debt.
Imperfect verification also implies other interesting properties of optimal contracts.
For instance, it means that borrowers can only pass a limited amount of risk on to
lenders, regardless of contracted audit strategies. Further, even when projects enjoy
constant returns to scale and audits are relatively inexpensive, firm size and leverage
is endogenously limited by the entrepreneur’s risk preference.
While our main results center on the optimality of debt, contrary to the existing
costly state verification literature, our model has implications for when equity-like con-
tracts are optimal. In short, we find that when audit signals are weakly correlated with
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true incomes, standard debt contracts emerge as optimal. Alternatively, if audit signals
are highly correlated with true incomes, optimal contracts resemble equity. Finally, the
model developed here looks to be able to engage in interesting ways with empirical data,
suggesting some interesting avenues for future research.
We conclude with two, more theoretical, observations. First, Harsanyi (1973)
presents an isomorphism between games with mixed strategy Nash equilibria and “dis-
turbed” games with stochastic payoffs and pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our findings
resonate with Harsanyi’s result; adding randomness to the audit signal encourages pure
strategy auditing. However, there is no direct isomorphism between mixed audit strate-
gies under perfect audits and deterministic audit strategies under imperfect audits in
our model.
Second, the standard debt contracts we derived under imperfect monitoring enjoy
an additional benefit that we did not formalize. When enforcement is certain, or near
certain, incentive compatibility is not sensitive to the risk tolerance of the entrepreneur.
That reduces the potential for adverse selection in two forms: first, the preferences of the
entrepreneur may be unobservable; second, the entrepreneur may have access to hid-
den wealth. The presence of either of these sources of asymmetric information would
make it more difficult to employ a stochastic incentive scheme.
Appendix A: Proofs
The proofs of results below are presented in the order in which they appear in the main
text.
Proof of Remark 1. Nonsufficiency. In the working paper version of the current pa-
per, we provide an example of multiplicity of locally optimal contracts, each of which
satisfy the first order conditions of Programme 1 (Duncan and Nolan 2017).
Nonnecessity. Let C be a contract with some report mi such that the audit probability
following this report is equal to 0, qi = 1. Consider the repayment zi(∅). This repayment,
zi(∅), occurs with zero probability in expected utility, in the participation constraint and
in the incentive compatibility constraint. Perturbing the value of zi(∅) has no effect on
expected utility or on feasibility. No first order condition exists for the repayment zi(∅).
However, the repayment zi(∅) does enter with positive probability into the first order
condition for qi; the costs and benefits of a marginal decrease in qi are dependent on the
value of the repayment zi(∅), which will be paid with positive probability after any such
perturbation. Starting from contract C, we can manipulate zi(∅) in any way, retaining
optimality and feasibility but violating the first order condition for qi reported below:
λ(θi)(α+ b)κ=
∑
σ
qi(θiσ |qi)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
U(θimiσ)+ λzi(σ)
+
∑
j
μijU(θimiσ)
−
∑
j
μji
(θj|σ)
(θi|σ)U(θjmiσ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ν0(mi)− ν1(mi)
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Alternatively, let C be a contract with the following property: the report–signal pair
(miσ) is such that (a) the repayment Z(miσ) enters the second term in the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (7) for an agent receiving revenue shock θj and considering
misreporting mi, and (b) is paid with probability 0 in truth-telling equilibrium (that is,
(a) (θjσ |Q(mi) > 0) and (b) (θiσ |Q(mi))= 0). The first order condition for Z(miσ)
cannot be satisfied. If C is an optimal contract, the repayment Z(miσ) will be suffi-
ciently large such that the incentive constraint is not binding. Any further increases in
the repayment Z(miσ) will leave expected utility constant and will not affect feasibil-
ity.
Proof of Proposition 1. To begin, we split Programme 1 into two distinct optimiza-
tion problems. First, the entrepreneur determines the audit strategy Q. Second, the en-
trepreneur determines the optimal repayment allocations Z , consumption allocations
X , and amount of resources initially transferred to the entrepreneur b. The second stage
of the problem is reported as Programme 2.
Programme 2. We have
max
ZX b
∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)
subject to
(α+ b)θi −Z(mjσ)−X (θimjσ)= 0
(
φij(σ)
)
∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)zi(σ)− bρ−
n∑
i=1
(θi)qi(α+ b)κ≥ 0 (λ)
∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)−
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)U(θimjσ)≥ 0 (μij)
Contemporaneous utility U is a concave function of consumption allocationsX and,
therefore, Programme 2 is nonconvex. Programme 2 cannot be convexified via rewriting
the program to solve for allocations of U directly.22 Before applying the Kuhn–Tucker
theorem to generate first order necessary conditions, we must first verify a constraint
qualification. We verify the Mangasarian–Fromowitz constraint qualification (Man-
gasarian and Fromovitz 1967).
Definition 4. Given a point C ∈ Rk and the active set A(C), let I(C) denote the in-
dices of binding inequality constraints gi(C)= 0 and equality constraints hj(C)= 0. The
Mangasarian–Fromowitz constraint qualification holds if and only if there exists a vector
22This substitution would generate a convex cost function X (·) = U−1(·). Recall that the budget con-
straints in our model are equality constraints, not inequality constraints. The introduction of convex cost
function X would make the budget constraints nonconvex.
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d ∈Rk such that
∇gi(C)′d > 0 ∀i ∈ I(C)
∇hj(C)′d = 0 ∀j ∈ I(C)
Lemma 1. Programme 2 satisfies the Mangasarian–Fromowitz constraint qualification.
Proof23. The active set A(C) of the subproblem consists of the budget constraints, the
participation constraint, and the active incentive constraints (as the audit probabilities
are predetermined, the upper and lower bounds on audit probabilities are not active in
the subproblem, Programme 2). We start by reporting the gradients of the equality and
inequality constraints:
∇BC:
∂BCijσ
∂b
= −θ ∂BCijσ
∂Z(mjσ)
= 1 ∂BCijσ
∂X (θimjσ)
= 1;
∇PC:
∂PC
∂b
= −
∑
θ
(θ)q(θ)κ− ρ ∂PC
∂Z(mσ) = 
(
θσ |q(θ));
∇ICCij :
∂ICCij
∂Z(miσ)
= −(θiσ |q(mi))U ′(θimiσ)
∂ICCij
∂Z(mjσ)
= (θiσ |q(mj))U ′(θimjσ)
∂ICCij
∂b
=
∑
σ

(
θiσ |q(mi)
)
θiU ′(θimiσ)
−
∑
σ

(
θiσ |q(mj)
)
θiU ′(θimjσ)
We wish to construct a vector d, specified by Definition 4. Now let D : C → R be a
mapping from the vector of contract terms in C to the reals. The elements of vector d
are represented by the images of function D, such that without loss of generality, di =
D(Z(mσ)) if and only if Ci =Z(mσ). We search for some function D such that
∑
c∈C
∂gi
∂c
D(c) > 0 and
∑
c∈C
∂hj
∂c
D(c)= 0
We construct D with three steps. First we set D(b), second we set D(Z), and finally
we set D(X ).
23The proof does rely on the impermissability of high messages following low revenue states. A more
general proof that relaxes this assumption is available from the authors on request.
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First, set
D(b)= 0
Second, we set the values associated with repayment allocations D(Z(miσ)).
Choose some signal σ ′′ such that (θjσ ′′|qj) > 0. Set D(Z(mjσ ′′)) > 0. We now
have ∑
c∈C
∂PC
∂c
D(c) > 0
This inequality is retained by ensuring nonnegativity of all D(Z(mσ)).
Now, for i ∈ (23     n) and j ∈ {12     i}, choose some signal σ ′ij such that
(θiσ
′
ij|qj) > 0. Set D(Z(mjσ ′ij)) sufficiently high such that
∑
σ
[
∂ICCij
∂Z(miσ)
D(Z(miσ))+ ∂ICCij
∂Z(mjσ)
D(Z(mjσ))
]
> 0
Third and finally, we need to satisfy the Mangasarian–Fromowitz conditions for the
budget constraints. These constraints are equality constraints; therefore, we set
D(X (θimjσ))= −D(Z(mjσ))
This ensures ∑
cθimjσ
∂BCijσ
∂c
D(c)= 0
completing the proof.
Lemma 1 allows us to apply the Kuhn–Tucker theorem to derive necessary condi-
tions for Programme 2 using a first order approach.24
The first order necessary conditions for Programme 2 are
zi(σ) : 0= −(θiσ |qi)U ′(θimiσ)+ λ(θiσ |qi)
−
∑
j
μij(θiσ |qi)U ′(θimiσ)
+
∑
j
μji(θjσ |qi)U ′(θjmiσ) (11)
b : 0=
∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)θiU ′(θimiσ)− λ
[
ρ+
n∑
i=1
(θi)qiκ
]
+
∑
ij
μijθi
[∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U ′(θimiσ)
−
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)U ′(θimjσ)
]
 (12)
24See, for example, Bertsekas (1995).
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By Bayes’ theorem, we can rewrite (θiσ |qj)= (σ(qj)|θi)(θi)= (θi|σ(qj))(σ(qj)).
It follows that we have
(θiσ |qj)
(θjσ |qj) =
(θi|σ)
(θj|σ)
We can now divide (11) by (θiσ |qi) and rearrange to obtain
U ′(θimiσ)
λ
= 1
1+
∑
j
μij
[
1+
∑
j
μji
(θj|σ)
(θi|σ)
U ′(θjmiσ)
λ
]
 (8)
Use (11) to eliminate the terms∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)θiU ′(θimiσ)+
∑
ij
μijθi
∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U ′(θimiσ)
from (12):
0=
∑
i
θi
∑
σ
λ(θiσ |qi)− λ
[
ρ+
n∑
i=1
(θi)qiκ
]
+
∑
i
θi
∑
σ
∑
j
μji(θjσ |qi)U ′(θjmiσ)
−
∑
i
θi
∑
σ
∑
j
μij(θiσ |qj)U ′(θimjσ)
Relabelling the summands in the third term (swapping the is and js) allows us to simplify
0=
∑
i
θi
∑
σ
λ(θiσ |qi)− λ
[
ρ+
n∑
i=1
(θi)qiκ
]
+
∑
ij
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)μij(θj − θi)U ′(θimjσ)
The first term is just the product of the shadow cost of the participation constraint λ and
expected returns.25 Collecting terms in λ, we obtain (9):
λ
[∑
i
(θi)(θi − qiκ)− ρ
]
=
∑
ij
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)μij(θi − θj)U ′(θimjσ)
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) Part (i) follows from inspection of (8). If ICCji /∈ A(C)
∀j, then (8) becomes
U ′(θimiσ)= λ
1+
∑
j
μij

which is constant for all σ .
25We have (
∑
i θi
∑
σ (θiσ |qi)=
∑
iσ (θiσ |qi)θ=
∑
i (θi)θ) by the law of total probability.
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(ii) Consider revenue shock θi such that there exists some shock θj with the property
that ICCji ∈ A(C). Start with the first order necessary condition for repayment
allocations Z(miσ), equality (8), which is repeated for convenience:
0= −
(
1+
∑
k
μik
)
U ′(θimiσ)+ λ+
∑
j
μji
(θj|σ)
(θi|σ)U
′(θjmiσ)
We are interested in seeing how the repayment allocation Z(miσ) must respond
to fluctuations in the marginal likelihood ratio, ji (σ) :=
(θj |σ)
(θi|σ) . Holding i con-
stant, the remaining terms in μ, λ are held constant as we vary the repayment
signal σ . Take the total derivative with respect to  and the repayment allocation
Z(miσ):
0=
(
1+
∑
k
μik
)
U ′′(θimiσ)dZ(miσ)
−
∑
j
μji
j
i (σ)U ′′(θjmiσ)dZ(miσ)
+
∑
j
μjiU ′(θjmiσ)dji (σ)
Divide through by (1 + ∑k μik)U ′(θimiσ)(= λ + ∑j μji (θj |σ)(θi|σ)U ′(θjmiσ) by
(8)) and substitute A(x)= −U ′′(x)U ′(x) :
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣A(θimiσ)−
∑
j
μji
j
i (σ)
λ+
∑
j
μji
j
i (σ)
A(θjmiσ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ dZ(miσ)
=
∑
j
μji
1+
∑
k
μik
U ′(θjmiσ)
U ′(θimiσ)
d
j
i (σ)
By the assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, A(θjmiσ) ≤ A(θi
miσ). The multipliers μ, λ and the likelihood ratios  are all nonnegative;
therefore, the difference A(θimiσ) −
∑
j μji
j
i (σ)
λ+∑j μjiji (σ)A(θjmiσ) and the ratio∑
j μji
1+∑k μik
U ′(θjmiσ)
U ′(θimiσ) are strictly positive. It follows that
d
j
i (σ)
dZ(miσ) > 0, completing the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let the financial intermediary’s participation con-
straint be nonbinding. Letσ be a signal with the property that(θnσ |qn) > 0. We
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can reduce the repayment Z(mnσ), which tightens the currently slack participa-
tion constraint, increases expected utility, and relaxes the incentive constraints
ICCni for i ∈ {123     n− 1}.
(ii) The highest possible report mn appears only on the left hand side of incentive
constraints. By Corollary 1, the optimal repayment allocation Z(mnσ) is not
contingent on the audit signal σ . It follows that we can remove all audits of re-
ports mn without affecting expected utility or the incentive constraints, but relax-
ing the participation constraint for any positive audit cost.
(iii) Let C be a contract with no binding incentive constraints.
Case (a). If all audit probabilities are equal to 0,Q(m)= 0 ∀m, then we can verify
the proposition directly from the first order condition for Z . When no audits are
undertaken, incentive compatibility requires X (θimi∅) = X (θjmj∅) + (α +
b)(θi − θj) by (7). If no incentive constraints are binding, then the first order
condition for Z states that U ′(θimi∅)= λ= U ′(θjmj∅), a contradiction.
Case (b). If there exists a positive audit probability for some report Q(mi) > 0,
then we can reduce this audit probability, replacing the foregone audits with a
lottery that replicates the distribution of the true audit technology conditional
upon truth-telling. For details, see the proof of Theorem 1.
(d) If repayment allocations are not contingent on audit signals, then we can apply
the same argument from part (iii)(a).
If repayment allocations are contingent on audit signals, then there exist i, σ , σ ′
such that X (θimiσ) =X (θimiσ ′). It follows that U ′(θimiσ) = U ′(θimiσ ′).
This is consistent with the first order condition for repayment allocations (8) only
if there exists some j such that μji > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume audits are perfect with strictly positive cost ((θ|σ) ∈
{01} and κ > 0). Let C be a truth-telling contract with the feature that there is some
report mi that is followed by a certain audit, qi = 1. Assume that under contract C, any
truth-telling agent enjoys some strictly positive probability of avoiding immiseration:
∀i, ∑σ (θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ) > U .
Perturbation 1. Consider the set of repayment allocations contingent on reported
income mi that occur with zero probability under truth-telling. Set all of the repayment
allocations in this set equal to their corresponding maximal repayments:
if (θi|σ)= 0 and (θj|σ)= 1 then Z ′(miσ)= (α+ b)θj
Following Perturbation 1, any agent who misreports θi is immiserated with certainty. By
assumption, truth-telling agents are not immiserated with positive probability. It follows
that the incentive constraints ICCji are nonbinding for all j.
Perturbation 2. Following the reported message mi, employ the audit technology
with probability (1 − s). With probability s, draw a signal σs from the distribution
σs ∼ (θi), that is, let (σs|θi) = (σ |θi) for all values of σs and σ . Retain the same re-
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payment schedule, but now condition repayments on eitherσ orσs, whichever is drawn,
Z ′′(miσ ∪ σs)=Z ′(miσ).
The new signal has no resource cost. However, the new strategy saves audit costs
worth (θi)s(α + b)κ. This savings relaxes the participation constraint of the financial
intermediary. Agents who truthfully report message mi experience no change in their
conditional distribution of repayments and, therefore, no change in expected utility.
This also implies that for agents receiving return θi, their opportunity cost of misreport-
ing remains constant, and the perturbation does not violate any incentive constraint of
the form ICCij . Following Perturbation 1, incentive constraints of the form ICCji are
slack before Perturbation 2, and remain slack for sufficiently small s.
Taken together, Perturbations 1 and 2 relax a financial intermediary’s participation
constraint while maintaining incentive compatibility and expected utility. We can con-
tinue to apply Perturbations 1 and 2 to each report that motivates certain auditing under
the initial contract C until all audit probabilities are strictly below 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the proposition by solving for the contract that
implements full insurance with the lowest possible total audit cost. When audit costs
are 0, the full insurance, first-best, allocation is feasible and optimal. However, when au-
dit costs are 0, excessive audits do not incur welfare costs. When audit costs are strictly
positive but approaching 0, optimal repayment allocations approach the first-best allo-
cations, but audit strategies ration audits to reduce resource costs.
The incentive constraint for an agent receiving true return i and considering whether
to report message j (7) is∑
σ
(θiσ |qi)U(θimiσ)≥
∑
σ
(θiσ |qj)U(θimjσ)
Denote the full insurance consumption bundle by x∗. Under the full insurance alloca-
tion, agent i receives allocation x∗ under truth-telling with certainty, so we can replace
the left hand side with U(x∗). Following a false report of message mj , agent i would
receive consumption allocation x∗ + (α+ b)(θi − θj) if (s)he is not audited. This repre-
sents the full insurance allocation x∗ received by any truth-telling agent j, plus the dif-
ference in revenue between out-turns i and j. If audited, an agent i who misreports mj
would have his/her true return revealed with certainty under perfect audits, and would
be charged a maximal penalty. This agent would receive utility allocation Umin, equal to
the lower support of the range of the utility function U if a lower support exists. If a lower
support does not exist, Umin can be set arbitrarily low. The incentive constraint can now
be rewritten as
U(x∗)= (1− qj)U(x∗ + (α+ b)(θi − θj))+ qjUmin
We can solve explicitly for the minimal audit probability necessary to attain incentive
compatibility:
qj =
U(x∗ + (α+ b)(θi − θj))− U(x∗)
U(x∗ + (α+ b)(θi − θj))− Umin 
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This condition gives us the limiting optimal audit probability as audit costs approach 0.
If the range of U is unbounded below, incentive compatibility can be attained with qj
arbitrarily close to 0. If the range of U is bounded below, we can attain incentive com-
patibility with strictly interior qj .
Proof of Proposition 4. To complete the proof, we use Proposition 1 to argue di-
rectly from the first order conditions (8) and (9). Set all audit probabilities equal to 1,
Q(θ)= 1. Under perfect audits, this leaves (θσ) ∈ {01} ∀(θσ). It follows that the first
order condition for repayments Z expressed as (8) can only be satisfied when μij = 0
∀j i. If we substitute this result into (9), the right hand side is equal to 0. It follows
that when κ < E(θ)− ρ, the first order condition for the borrowing cannot be satisfied:
the marginal value of additional borrowing always exceeds the marginal cost. To show
that entrepreneur consumption is also infinite, substitute this result into Constraints 1
and 3.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let the value of any feasible contract C be denoted by the
value function V :
V(C) :=
∑
iσ

(
θiσ |qi(C)
)U(θimiσ |C)
Denote the supremum of V by
Vˆ := sup
C
V(C)
For any sequence of feasible contracts Cs with the property that V(Cs) → Vˆ , we show
that there exists Cˆ with the properties that Cˆ is feasible and that V(Cˆ) = Vˆ . This result is
sufficient to show that optimal contracts exist.
Recall that contract C is a tuple (bQZX ). We limit our arguments to borrowing b
and consumption X , as the auditing strategy is defined over a compact set, and repay-
ment Z is uniquely determined by repayments and borrowing in combination with the
ex post budget constraints (Constraint 1).
(a) Lower limit of consumption.
Case 1: Utility is bounded below, U(0)=U for some U ∈R. When utility is bounded
below, then the lower bound on consumption is feasible, and the set of feasible con-
sumption allocations contains its lower limit points.
Case 2: Utility is unbounded below, limx→0 U(x)= −∞. Take a sequence of contracts
with the property that X s(θimiσ)→ 0 for some (θiσ) such that s(θimiσ) > 0.
Let U0 := U(αρ). This is the value afforded an agent who deposits all of his/her wealth
risk-free with the financial intermediary, b = −αρ. This value is finite, U0 ∈ (−∞∞).
By continuity of the utility function, V(Cs) → V∗ ≥ U0. It follows that the product
s(θimiσ)U(X s(θimiσ)) approaches a finite value. Since U(X s(θimiσ)) → −∞,
the audit probability s(θimiσ) approaches 0:
s(θimiσ)→ 0 (13)
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Let contract C∗ be defined as follows. All contract terms in C∗ are equal to those
specified by Cs aside from
X ∗(θimiσ)= (α+ b)θi Z∗(miσ)= 0
By construction, this contract satisfies the ex post budget constraints (Constraint 1).
Consider the participation constraint. Under the new contract, this constraint is
tightened by amount s(θimiσ)Zs(miσ). By (13), the audit probability s(θimi
σ) → 0; by the ex post budget constraints (Constraint 1), the repayment allocation
Zs(miσ) is finite. It follows that the product s(θimiσ)Zs(miσ) → 0 and the par-
ticipation constraint remains satisfied after the perturbation.
Consider a binding incentive compatibility constraint for an agent earning θj > θi.
Under the new contract, this binding constraint is tightened by
s(θjmiσ)U
((
α+ bs)(θj − θi)+X s(θimiσ))
The utility allocation U((α + bs)(θj − θi) + X s(θimiσ)) → U((α + bs)(θj − θi)) ∈
(−∞∞). The probability s(θjmiσ)→ 0.26 It follows that
s(θjmiσ)U
((
α+ bs)(θj − θi)+X s(θimiσ))→ 0 (14)
and, therefore, that the incentive compatibility constraint remains satisfied.
We have shown that the contract C∗ is feasible and improves expected utility. But the
new consumption bundle is now nonzero (X ∗(θimiσ)= (α+b)θi); therefore, the limit
of the sequence Cs does not specify a supremum.
(b)Upper limit of consumption. Consider a sequence of contracts with the property
that X s(θimiσ) → ∞ for some (θiσ) such that s(θimiσ) > 0. It follows by the ex
post budget constraints (Constraint 1) that Zs(miσ)→ −∞.
The financial intermediary’s participation constraint requires∑
iσ
s(θiσ)Zs(miσ)≥ bsρ+
∑
i
(θi)Qs(mi)κ
Borrowing bs is bounded below by −α. Expected audit costs ∑i (θi)Qs(mi)κ are
bounded by [0κ]. By part (a) of this proof, combined with the ex post budget constraints
(Constraint 1), we also know that
Zs(mjσ ′)≤ (α+ bs)θj ∀jσ ′
Together, we have
s(θiσ)Zs(miσ) ≥ bsρ−
(
α+ bs)E(θi)
s(θiσ) ≤
bsρ− (α+ bs)E(θi)
Zs(miσ)

26Earlier we saw that s(θimiσ) → 0. This must mean either that qsi → 0 if σ is an audit signal or that
qsi → 1 if σ is the null signal. Either way, it follows that s(θjmiσ)→ 0 ∀j.
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Consider the contract C∗ defined with all terms equal to those specified by Cs aside
from
X ∗(θimiσ)= (α+ b)θi Z∗(miσ)= 0
By construction, this contract satisfies the ex post budget constraints (Constraint 1).
The effect of this perturbation on the financial intermediary’s participation con-
straint is positive, with expected repayments increasing by s(θiσ)(−Zs(miσ)).
Expected utility decreases by
V∗ − Vs = s(θiσ)
[U((α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)]
≤ (bsρ− (α+ bs)E(θi))U
((
α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)
Zs(miσ)

Concavity of the utility function implies that as Zs(miσ)→ −∞, the fraction
U((α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)
Zs(miσ)
→ 0
Therefore, the perturbation delivers V∗ = Vˆ .
Now we turn to incentive compatibility. First we consider the incentive of an agent
receiving θi truthfully to report his/her income; then we turn to an agent θj = θi. Condi-
tional upon receiving shock θi, the expected utility of the agent decreases by
s(σ |θi)
[U((α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)]
= 
s(θiσ)
(θi)
[U((α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)]
≤
(
bsρ− (α+ bs)E(θi)
(θi)
)
× U
((
α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)
Zs(miσ)

Concavity of the utility function implies that as Zs(miσ)→ −∞, the fraction
U((α+ bs)θi −Zs(miσ))− U((α+ bs)θi)
Zs(miσ)
→ 0
Therefore, the expected utility attained by truth-telling for an agent receiving shock θi is
unchanged after the perturbation—incentive compatibility is retained.
For an agent receiving shock θj = θi, his/her expected repayment after reporting mi
is higher than before the perturbation, Z∗(miσ) > Zˆ(miσ). Therefore, without loss
of generality, the incentive compatibility constraint for agents receiving shock θj and
considering report mi is relaxed after the perturbation.
In sum, contract C∗ is feasible, has finite consumption and delivers V∗ = Vˆ .
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(c) Upper limit of borrowing. First note that borrowing b is bounded below by −α,
where b= −α is feasible and implies V = U(αρ). So we are concerned with establishing
a closed upper bound on borrowing b.
By Proposition 6, we know that nonnegative consumption implies the upper bound
on leverage
α+ b
α
≤ ρ
ρ−
(
θ1 −
∑
i
(θi)Q(θi)κ
) 
Take a sequence of contracts with the property that bs → b¯, where b¯ is the upper limit
of borrowing. By Proposition 6, this implies that there exists a state (θiσ) where
X s(θimiσ)→ 0 and (θiσ) > 0. It follows that limx→0 U(x)= −∞. From here, we can
apply the same arguments from part (a) of this proof to show that the sequence does not
converge to a supremum, and, therefore, that an interior optimal borrowing allocation
exists.
Proof of Theorem 2. Audit technologies. Assumption 1 does not guarantee informa-
tiveness of audits. Indeed, it is permissible that there may exist states θi, θj with the
property that ∀σ subject to (θiσ) > 0 ∨ (θjσ) > 0, (σ |θi) = (σ |θj). If so, we say
that the audit technology is uninformative with respect to revenue states j, i.
Let l denote the lowest state for which all the audit technology is uninformative with
respect to state l and all states greater than l. If the audit signal were perfect, then l
would equal n, the number of states; if the audit signal were independent of the revenue
state, then l would equal 1.
We proceed to demonstrate that for κ sufficiently low, standard debt contracts with
qi = 1 for i < l and qi = 0 for i≥ l are optimal. We start by demonstrating that there exists
an optimal contract that takes the form of standard debt; then we show that standard
debt is exclusively optimal for small increases in audit costs.
Lemma 2. Let κ = 0. Then there exists an optimal contract that takes the form of a stan-
dard debt contract with
q(θi)=
{
0 ∀i≥ l
1 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Proposition 5, an optimal contract exists. To see that optimal
contracts exist with q(θi) = 0 for i ≥ l, refer to the first order condition for repayments
(Proposition 1, (8)), which shows that if the audit signal σ is independent of the rev-
enue state for revenue pair i, j, then repayments following reports mi, mj are indepen-
dent of audit signals. It follows that repayments following reports for all states i ≥ l are
not dependent on audit signals, and these signals can be discarded (or q(θi)= 0) for all
i≥ l.
For reports i < l, note that audits do not impose a resource cost and, therefore, can
be employed with probability 1 at no cost.
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Lemma 3. Following Lemma2, consider an optimal standard debt contractwith q(θi)= 0
∀i≥ l and 1 otherwise. For each i < l, there is no optimal contract with q(θi) < 1.
Proof. By Proposition 1, (8), we know that the optimal repayment allocations following
report i will be contingent on the audit signal σ if and only if there exists j > i such that
(i) the audit technology is informative with respect to revenue states i, j and (ii) the
incentive compatibility constraint between the two revenue states is binding (μji > 0).
(i) By construction of l, the audit technology is informative with respect to revenue
states θl−1, θl. This means that the conditional distribution of audit signals differs
across these two revenue states. Let θi be a revenue state with i < l. The audit
technology must be informative with respect to either the pair θi, θl−1 or the pair
θi, θl, or both.
(ii) Consider Proposition 1, (8). Assumption 3 ensures that the ratio
(θj |σ)
(θi|σ) is finite
valued for all σ . It follows that if the incentive constraints ICCji were not bind-
ing for all j > i, then the repayment mapping Z(miσ) would not be contingent
on σ . We also know that the signal ml is not audited by Lemma 2. This generates a
contradiction: if repayments are not contingent on audit signals for either reports
ml or mi and θl = θi, then the incentive constraint ICCli would be binding for any
optimal repayment profile.
Combining (a) and (b) with Proposition 1, we observe that the optimal repayment al-
locations under q(θi) = 1 cannot be replicated with q(θi) < 1 for i < l. Therefore, no
optimal contract exists such that q(θi) < 1.
Proof of Theorem 2 (continued). Let C be an optimal contract with some strictly
positive κ and at least one i for which qi ∈ (01). If i ≥ l, then, similarly to the case
described in Lemma 2, optimal repayments are not contingent on the signal revealed
following report mi, and the audit probability qi can be set equal to 0 without having
any effect on expected utility or incentive compatibility, and relaxing the participation
constraint. This generates a contradiction; the original contract C must not have been
optimal.
For i < l, then we can decompose the welfare effects of an increase in qi to 1 into two
components: a risk sharing benefit and a budgetary cost, denoted δ1 and δ2 in units of
expected welfare.
First, we perturb the contract to set q′i = 1 for all i < l and qi ∈ (01). We then set
consumption allocations optimally conditional upon the new audit strategy, holding
expected consumption constant. Denote this updated consumption schedule x′. By
Lemma 3, the updated consumption schedule (i) leaves consumption allocations con-
tingent on audit signals, (ii) for each i, leaves the incentive compatibility constraints
ICCji binding for some j > i, and (iii) cannot be replicated with a lower audit proba-
bility qi. It follows that the adjustment in repayment schedule must result in a strictly
positive welfare gain, δ1 > 0.
To obtain an upper bound on the welfare cost of the tightened participation con-
straint, consider the allocation x′ := minkσ X ′(θkmkσ). It is clear from Assumption 1
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that the θk that satisfies this minimand is θk = θ1. Consider a perturbation that funds
the increase in audit costs by reducing the consumption allocation x′. This perturbation
relaxes any initially binding incentive constraint ICCj1 for any j, and leaves all other
binding incentive constraints unaffected. By Jensen’s inequality, the welfare cost of this
perturbation is bounded above by
δ2 <
∑
i|qi∈(01)
(α+ b)πi(1− qi)κU ′
(
x′ −
∑
i|qi∈(01)
πi(1− qi)κ
)

By Proposition 5, x′ exists and is strictly positive; further, the utility allocation U(x′) ∈
(−∞∞). Therefore, when κ is small, δ2 exists, and as κ → 0, we have δ2 → 0. It fol-
lows that for sufficiently low κ, δ2 < δ1, and there exists a standard debt contract that is
superior to the initial contract C.
Proof of Proposition 6. From the budget constraints (1), we have X (θjmiσ) =
X (θimiσ) + (α + b)(θj − θi). By assumption, (θiσ |qi) > 0 ∀θiσ . If consumption
is nonnegative for all truth-telling states, X (θimiσ) ≥ 0 ∀θiσ , then it follows that
the expectation on the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint ICCji
is bounded below as
∑
σ(θjσ |qi)U(θjmiσ)≥ U((α+ b)(θj − θi)). Incentive compati-
bility requires∑
σ
(θjσ |qj)U(θjmjσ)≥
∑
σ
(θjσ |qi)U(θjmiσ)≥ U
(
(α+ b)(θj − θi)
)

which implies ∑
σ
(θjσ |qj)X (θjmjσ)≥ (α+ b)(θj − θi)
by Jensen’s inequality. Using the budget constraint (1), we convert this inequality into
an upper bound on repayments:∑
σ
(θjσ |qj)
[
(α+ b)θj −Z(mjσ)
] ≥ (α+ b)(θj − θi)
∑
σ
(θjσ |qj)Z(mjσ) ≤ (α+ b)θi
Now, substituting this into the participation constraint (6),∑
iσ
(θiσ |qi)Z(miσ) ≤ (α+ b)θ1
bρ+
n∑
i=1
(θi)qi(α+ b)κ ≤ (α+ b)θ1
which can be rearranged to complete the proof.
Appendix B: Figures
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